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Re-imagining the global: relocation
and local identities in Cairo
Farha Ghannam
Short of a certain threshold of likelihood, only magical solutions remain.
Magical hope is the outlook on the future characteristic of those who have
no real future before them. (Bourdieu 1979: 69)

‘Praise the Prophet. Once upon a time, there was an old woman who
used to live in an apartment that was as small as that tiny table [pointing
to the small table in their living room]. Each time the old woman swept
the floor, she found either one pound or 50 piasters [an Egyptian pound
is worth around 34 cents] that she kept hidden in a place in her window.
The old woman was saving to buy a larger apartment. But one day, a
thief stole all the money that she saved. She was very sad. An afriit
[demon or ghost] appeared and asked the old woman what she would
like to have. She asked for a larger apartment. The afriit asked her,
“Would you like the apartment to have a balcony.'”’ and she answered
yes. He asked her, “Would you like a television set, a fan and a bottle of
water?” [describing some of the things that were in front of us in the
living room]. The old woman said yes. Then he asked her, “And would
you like some pictures of Samira Said and Latifa?” [two popular female
Moroccan and Tunisian singers whose posters were decorating the wall
of the living room]. The woman again answered yes. The afriit brought
all these things for the old woman. She was very happy and cried out of
joy. In the same day, however, she smelled the birshaam} that was hidden
behind the television set which caused her heart to collapse [gham ala
albaha] and the old woman died’ (a story told to me by the five-year-old
Amal in Cairo, 1994).
Amal’s narrative was contextualized by her family’s attempts to find a
larger housing unit to move into from the one-bedroom apartment that
she, her four sisters and their parents have been occupying since 1980,
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when the family was displaced from their home in the centre of the city
and relocated in al-Zawiya al-Hamra in northern Cairo. Amal’s images
of the desired home are constructed, as is the case with many other
children, from global images transmitted to them through television
programmes, school textbooks and visits to different parts of the city.
Her dreams, as well as those of her sisters, of the future apartment are
informed by the movies and soap operas that they like to watch: a big
apartment with a balcony, a spacious kitchen, modern furniture and
organized spatial arrangements inside and outside the unit. These images
contradict the objective realities of Amal’s life and create desires that
cannot be satisfied even through some magical means. Like the dreams
of many other low-income people, Amal’s discourse ‘proceeds in a jagged
line, the leaps into daydream being followed by relapses into a present
that withers all fantasies’ (Bourdieu 1979: 69). Death and destruction is
the ultimate answer.
Amal, her family and the rest of their neighbours are not fax-users,
e-mail receivers, jumbo jet travellers or satellite-owners. They are part
of Cairo’s working class whose experience of ‘the global’ is structured
by their economic resources and position in social space. In addition to
the many consumer goods, especially television sets, that are desired by
people and are becoming signs of distinction, Amal’s family and many
other families experienced the force of the global in their displacement
from their ‘locality’ in the centre of the city. Their houses were
demolished to be replaced by buildings and facilities that cater to upperclass Egyptians, international tourists and the transnational community.
In this chapter, I focus on relocation, utilized as part of the state efforts
to ‘modernize’ Cairo and its people, to show how global discourses and
forces are articulated in contradictory ways at the national and local
levels. In the first section, I present a brief review of the history of the
relocation of roughly 5000 working-class families from 1979 to 1981 and
the state public discourse utilized to justify the project. This discourse
strategically appealed to the global in the state’s attempts to implement
its different economic policies and to construct a modern national
identity. In the second part, I draw on my recent ethnographic research
in Cairo, or Umm al-Dunya (the mother of the world) as Egyptians like
to refer to it, to map some of the identities that are attached to and
formed by Amal’s group to show how the displacement of the local by
global processes and national policies brought new changes that paved
the way to redefine local communal feelings in ways that help people live
in the modern world. I argue that religious identity, as a hegemonic
identity in the formation, was consolidated by the changes brought by
the global as experienced by the people and as filtered in national policies.
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Modernity and the struggle over urban space
With her vast capabilities, the United States is bound in duty, even naturally
expected, to assist all those striving for a better future alike for themselves
and for the whole world. (Sadat 1978: 328)

In Search for Identity (1978), Anwar el-Sadat presents a strong critique
of Nasser’s policies that kept the country isolated from its neighbours
and the rest of the world and destroyed Egypt’s economy. To remedy
the country’s chronic economic and financial problems, Sadat reversed
Nasser’s policies by suspending relationships with the Soviet Union and
reorienting Egypt towards the West. He turned to the United States in
particular for aid in resolving Egypt’s conflict with Israel as well as the
economic and technological development of the country. After his victory
in the 1973 war (at least it was a victory for him), Sadat crystallized his
new visions and ideas in declaring ‘the open-door policy’ or infitah in
1974. This policy aimed to ‘open the universe ... open the door for fresh
air and remove all the barriers (hawajiz) and walls that we built around
us to suffocate ourselves by our own hands’ (Sadat 1981: 12). As he
explained to a group of young Egyptian men, Sadat’s infitah was motiv
ated by his belief that each one of them would like to ‘get married, own
a villa, drive a car, possess a television set and a stove, and eat three
meals a day’ (Sadat 1981: 12).
Sadat’s policy strived to modernize the country through speeding
planned economic growth, promoting private investment, attracting
foreign and Arab capital, and enhancing social development (Ikram 1980).
Private local and international investments were expected to secure the
capital needed to construct modern Egypt. Egyptians were encouraged
to work in oil-producing countries and invest their remittances in the
building of the country. At the same time, laws were enacted to secure
the protection needed to encourage foreign investors and to facilitate the
operation of private capital. Investments in tourism were especially im
portant because they were expected to ‘yield high economic returns and
provide substantial foreign exchange and well-paid employment’ (Ikram
1980: 309).
This orientation to the global, the outside, or the ‘universe’ as Sadat
describes it, required a ‘distinctive bundle of time and space practices
and concepts’ (Harvey 1990: 204). Many changes were needed to facilitate
the operation of capital and meet the new demands that were created.
For example, the growing demand for luxury and middle-class housing
for the transnational community and Egyptians who work in oilproducing countries inflated the price of land, especially in the centre of
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the city, and increased the cost of construction materials (Rageh 1984).
The promotion of private and foreign investment also increased the
demand for offices and work-oriented spaces. High-rises proliferated
around Cairo, using Western design principles and Los Angeles and
Houston, Sadat’s favourite American cities, became the models that were
to be duplicated (Ibrahim 1987).
Two tendencies were expressed in the discourses and policies of urban
planning that aimed to promote the infitah policies and to rebuild modern
Cairo. The first tried to integrate into the modern city areas of signi
ficance to Egypt’s glorious past (for example, the pyramids and Islamic
monuments), which Sadat loved to emphasize and which were visited by
tourists. The second tendency, which is the subject of this chapter,
attempted to reconstruct the ‘less desirable’ parts, especially popular
quarters, that did not represent the ‘modern’ image of Egypt and were
not fit to be gazed at by upper-class Egyptians and foreign visitors.
The state, the global and the creation of the ‘modern’ city‘s
Faust has been pretending not only to others but to himself that he
could create a new world with clean hands, he is still not ready to accept
responsibility for the human suffering and death that clear the way. (Ber
man 1988: 68)

As part of Sadat’s larger plan to restructure the local landscape and
build ‘modern’ Cairo, around 5000 Egyptian families were moved during
the period from 1979 to 1981 from Central Cairo (Bulaq) to housing
projects built by the state in two different neighbourhoods; ‘Ain Shams
and al-Zawiya al-Hamra. Bulaq, once the site of the winter houses of
the rich, then a major commercial port and later an industrial centre
(Rugh 1979), had become unfit for the modern image that Sadat was
trying to construct. This area, which over the years had housed thousands
of Egyptian low-income families, is adjacent to the Ramsis Hilton, next
to the television station, around the corner from the World Trade Center,
across the river from Zamalek (an upper-class neighbourhood), overlooks
the Nile, and is very close to many of the facilities that are oriented to
foreign tourists. The area then occupied by low-income families became
very valuable because Sadat’s policies, as he proudly announced, increased
the price of the land which was needed to facilitate the operation of
capital. The old crowded houses were to be replaced by modern build
ings, luxury housing, five-star hotels, offices, multi-storey parking lots,
movie theatres, conference rooms, and centres of culture (al-Ahram 27
December 1979: 3). Officials thus emphasized the urgent need to remove
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the residents of this old quarter because many international companies
were ready to initiate economic and tourist investment in the area.
Expected profits from these investments would contribute to national
income and assist the state in securing money to build new houses for
the displaced groups {al-Ahram, 27 December 1979; 9). The residents’
efforts to stop their forced relocation did not materialize and their calls
upon the government to include them in the reconstruction of their area
were denied. Voices that protested the relocation were quickly silenced
and objections raised by the displaced population were considered
‘selfish’. Officials emphasized that the benefit of the ‘entire nation’ should
prevail over everything else {al-Ahram, 9 July 1979).
The local was also displaced to protect the state orientation to the
global. The relocation project took place two years after the famous 1977
riots that protested the increase in the prices of basic daily goods,
especially bread. Protesters targeted infitah-Klzttd facilities such as fivestar hotels and nightclubs, and chanted slogans against Sadat’s policies
(Abd El-Razaq 1979). The neighbourhood, with its narrow lanes and
crowded streets, made it impossible for the police to chase those who
participated in the riots {Mayo, 22 June 1981). The relocated group was
seen by the state and the state-controlled press as part of ‘a conspiracy
organized by communists’ that aimed to distort the achievements of the
infitah and their housing became an obstacle to the promotion of Sadat’s
policies and to police attempts to crush protest against these policies.
The rhetorical strategies employed by the state were largely based in
the appeal to the global. This appeal was manifested by the emphasis on
modernity^ and its objectification in material forms, rational planning,
the importance of visual aspects and the tourists’ gaze in representing
Cairo, the separation of the home from the workplace, international
investment, science, health, hygiene, green areas and clean environment,
consumer goods and the importance of the productive agent in the
construction of a modern national identity."^ The global was strategically
used to offer the people a ‘Faustian bargain’ (cf Berman 1988) which
forced the relocated group to pay a high price for Egypt’s opportunity to
be modernized’. Using force (police) and seduction (by appealing to the
global and offering alternative housing), the project removed them from
the centre of the city and deprived them of the benefits associated with
the modern facilities and the new changes that promised prosperity for
everyone. The group lost a major part of its economic and ‘symbolic
capital’, to use Bourdieu’s (1984) term, which was their central geo
graphical location. Relocation destroyed most of the group’s informal
economy, altered their access to many cheap goods and services, and
destroyed their social relationships and reordered their personal lives.
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As previously mentioned, the group was divided into two parts, each
relocated to a different neighbourhood away from the gaze of tourists
and upper-class Egyptians. One part, the focus of this study, was moved
to public housing (masaakin) units constructed for them in al-Zawiya alHamra in northern Cairo. The move into these units, which were labelled
as ‘modern’, promised to improve the lives of the people and turn them
into ‘healthy modern productive citizens who will contribute in the
construction of their mother country’ (al-Ahram, 27 December 1979).
The state’s project assumed a transparent relationship between space
and identity and totally ignored the role of social actors in transforming
and resisting its policies and ideologies. Rather than creating a unified
modern city, I argue that these policies created a more fragmented urban
fabric and paved the ground for other competing collective identities.
Religious identity in particular has successfully presented itself as a
powerful alternative that can articulate the various antagonistic identities
that are constructed in the relocation site.
Global discourses and local identities
Since Sadat started his open-door policy, Cairo has witnessed the intro
duction of new forms of communication,^ more emphasis on international
tourism, increasing importance of consumer goods, and a growing flow
of ideas related to civil society, democracy and political participation.
Theoretical developments in anthropology and cultural studies have
demonstrated that these global processes are not producing one dominant
culture but present a set of discourses and practices that are juxtaposed
in complex ways in local contexts (Hall 1991a; 1993; Massey 1994; Lash
and Urry 1994). Thus, contrary to the old conceptualization of the world
as becoming a ‘global village’, local differences and identities are not
destroyed but are being reinforced in many cases by global forces and
processes (Hall 1991b; 1993; Ray 1993; Massey 1994).
With the growing connectedness between different parts of the globe
and with the circulation of global discourses and images facilitated by
new systems of communication, the Other is becoming more identified
with the self in complex ways. The connectedness and tension between
the self and the Other is crucial to understanding how identities are
constructed and shift over time and how the Other is simultaneously
desired and dreaded. One example can be found in how people in Cairo
desire the global (in this case identified as the West) because it is organ
ized, clean, rich and ‘democratic’ and at the same time they distrust it
because it is associated with ‘moral corruption’, drugs and violence. The
focus on the connectedness and tension with the Other is therefore a
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necessary step to theorize the different ways that the global is reshaping
local identities and redrawing their boundaries. This focus will enable us
to conceptualize local identifications not as static but as always in the
process of formation and constructed of multiple discourses and as
composed ‘in and through ambivalence and desire’ (Hall 1991b: 49).
‘Globalization’, however, should not be reduced to ‘Americanization’
as some authors tend to do (Hall 1991a; Hannerz and Lofgren 1994).
While the ‘American conception of the world’ (Hall 1991a: 28) may be
hegemonic in various contexts, people experience the influence of other
globals . People in al-Zawiya al-Hamra not only experience the American
culture that is transmitted to them in movies starring Arnold Schwarzenegger but they also experience the global through oil-producing
countries where their children and male relatives work as well as through
the mixture of people who visit and work in Cairo from different Arab
countries. For example, women use oil for their hair that comes from
India via their sons who work in Kuwait and collect their wedding
trousseau from clothes, sheets and blankets brought from Kuwait; others
visit husbands in Saudi Arabia; and many have accumulated electrical
appliances from Libya where husbands and sons work. Despite the fact
that many of the consumer goods are produced in the West, their mean
ings are given to them by their users who live in al-Zawiya al-Hamra.
For many, consumer goods are investments that can be exchanged for
cash when needed. Several families use their refrigerators to cool water
during the summer but turn them into closets during the winter to store
household appliances. The global is also introducing new forms of identi
fication between the subjects of its processes. People, for example, enjoy
watching television, especially some of the global sports events such as
the soccer World Cup. Young men and women follow these games very
closely; they know the names of the Brazilian, German and Italian
players. Whfle watching these games, different identities compete for
priority: they shift from supporting African and Arab teams to cheering
for third world teams when they play against European teams (Brazil
against Germany, for example). People, thus, do not experience the global
as a coherent set of discourses and processes that are transmitted from
the West to the rest of the world but experience fragments and contra
dictory pieces that are filtered through other centres and that do not
necessarily present a unified ‘conception of the world’. Therefore, ‘the
global’, as an analytical concept, should be expanded to include a mixture
of images, discourses and goods that are brought to people through
various channels such as state-controlled media, commercial video tapes,
audio tapes that are distributed by Islamic activists, and consumer goods
brought to al-Zawiya al-Hamra by migrants to Arab countries.
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It is also important to remember that, as a theoretical concept, ‘the
local’ should not be confused, as Massey (1994) and Lash and Urry
(1994) argue, with the concrete, the empirical or the authentic or a
spatially bounded entity (Urry 1995). I use ‘local’ to mean ‘acts of positing
within particular contexts’ (Tsing 1993: 31). People attach multiple mean
ings to their localities that vary from one context to another. Despite the
fact that geographical space is used as a point of reference for several
local identities in Cairo, these different contexts share a set of social
relationships and identities that include those who are like us (local
people) and exclude people who are not like us (outsiders). Thus, when
people identify the relocated group as ‘those from Bulaq’, they are trying
to exclude them from another collective identity that includes people
who have been living in al-Zawiya and identify primarily with it. The
relocated people still refer to themselves as ‘people of Bulaq’ despite the
fact that they have been living in al-Zawiya for fifteen years. Many also
still identify with their old villages and towns that they left more than
fifty years ago. In short, there is not one ‘local’ but there are various
‘locals’ that are juxtaposed in complex ways with multiple ‘globals’.
Old places, new identities
Here in al-Zawiya, you do not find Pizza Hut and Kentucky Fried Chicken.
Such places can never get any profit in areas like this. People are poor and
the money they will pay for one meal in one of these restaurants will feed
the whole family for a week if not more. (A male shop-owner who works in
al-Zawiya but lives in another middle-class neighbourhood)

To understand the local identities that are in the process of formation in
al-Zawiya al-Hamra, it is important to remember that state practices and
discourses were based on what Foucault calls ‘dividing practices’
(Rabinow 1984: 8). The project started by separating and stigmatizing
the targeted population as an expedient rationalization of policies that
aim to modernize, normalize and reintegrate them within the larger
community. Not only were the housing conditions attacked by state
officials, but the people themselves were stigmatized and criticized. A
‘scientific’ social study conducted to determine the needs of the relocated
group revealed, as stated by the Minister of Construction and New
Communities, that the area of Bulaq in general and one of its neigh
bourhoods (al-Torgman) in particular have been shelters for qiradatia
(street entertainers who perform with a baboon or monkey), female
dancers, pedlars and drug dealers (al-Ahram, 27 December 1979: 3).
The ‘locals’ were also represented as passive, unhealthy and isolated
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people who did not contribute to the construction of the mother-country
and who had many social ills.* After resettlement, these publicized stereo
types fostered a general feeling of antagonism towards the newcomers.
In addition to repeating the same words that were circulated in the
media, residents of al-Zawiya added other stereotypes to describe this
group such as labat (trouble-makers) and shalaq (insolent). Women, in
particular, were singled out (as they were also singled out by the Minister
who described them as dancers or Ghawazi); they were described as
rude and vulgar, and were used in daily conversation as an analogy for
bad manners.
These negative constructions of the relocated group are supported
and perpetuated by the physical segregation of their housing (masaakin)
from the rest of the community. Their public housing is clearly defined
and separated from other projects and private houses (ahali). Public
housing is characterized by a unified architectural design (the shape, the
size of the buildings, as well as the colours of walls and windows),
whereas private housing has more diversified patterns. This unity in
design and shape sharply defines and differentiates public housing from
private houses and makes it easier to maintain boundaries that separate
the relocated from other groups. In short, neither the discourse of the
state nor the shape and location of the housing project enhance the
dialogical relationship between the relocated group and other groups in
al-Zawiya. After fourteen or fifteen years of resettlement, the relocated
group continues to be stigmatized and its interaction with the rest of the
neighbourhood is restricted.
The identity of Bulaq With their stigmatization in the state discourse
and by the residents of al-Zawiya, and with the hostility that faced them,
the relocated population rediscovered their common history and identi
fication with the same geographical area. While people used to live in
Bulaq and identify strongly with their villages of origin, after relocation
Bulaq became an anchor for the group’s sense of belonging and took
precedence over other identifications. The attachment to the old place is
not single or one-dimensional and Bulaq is remembered and related to
differently by gender and age groups. These differences are beyond the
scope of this chapter but it is sufficient here to say that Bulaq is of great
significance for most of the group in reimagining their communal
feelings. Currently, their public housing is called after one of Bulaq’s
neighbourhoods {masaakin al-Torgman) and people express their strong
attachment to their old place in songs and daily conversations. Despite
the fact that relocation reordered relationships within the group and
destroyed a major part of their support system, the old neighbourhood

128

REDISCOVERING ISLAM

Still structures parts of the people’s current interaction. They still refer
to the people who used to live in Bulaq as ^min 'andina' (from our place)
which not only creates a common ground for identification but also
indicates certain expectations and mutual obligations between the people
in the current area of residence. At the same time, Bulaq is the point of
reference for their identification with those who still live in parts of
Bulaq’ and those who moved to ‘Ain Shams.
Through relocation, the group lost, among other things, a major part
of its ‘symbolic capital’. This is mainly manifested in two important
aspects related to group members’ identification with the old location.
First, they used to live next to an upper-class neighbourhood, Zamalek.
Young men and women, as emphasized by the people themselves and
documented in an famous old movie {A Bride from Bulaq), could even
claim that they were from Zamalek because only ‘a bridge’ separated (or
connected) the two neighbourhoods. People also lost the pleasure and
satisfaction associated with looking at the beautiful buildings and knowing
that people of Zamalek - and much to their shame, as described by one
informant — used to see Bulaq with its old and shabby houses.
Second, the group used to live in an ‘authentic popular’ or baladi area
and perceives its relocation in al-Zawiya as moving down the social ladder.
In Bulaq, the ‘authentic popular’ quarter, people used to live next to
each other, separated only by narrow lanes that allowed close interaction
and strong relationships. They remember the old place in the way people
used to cooperate and ‘eat together’. Their rootedness in the same place
over a long period of time provided people with a strong support system,
open social relationships, and a sense of security and trust. In contrast,
al-Zawiya is a relatively new neighbourhood. It was mainly agricultural
fields until the 1960s, when the area started to expand rapidly with the
state construction of the first public housing project. This project housed
families from different parts of Cairo who could not afford to live in
more central locations. Immigrants (mostly Muslims) also came to alZawiya from different parts of the countryside and many live in private
housing. The heterogeneity of its population is used by its residents,
especially members of the relocated group, and people around them to
indicate that al-Zawiya is not ‘an authentic popular quarter’. Its people
are ‘selfish’, ‘sneaky’ and ‘untrustworthy’. It is seen as located between
balad? and raqqi (upper-class areas) which places it, as described by a
male informant, in a tedious or annoying (baaykh) position. Al-Zawiya,
thus, is geographically and socially marginal compared to Bulaq.
A key word in understanding the differences between what is seen as
an ‘authentic’ neighbourhood such as Bulaq and ‘less authentic’ newer
neighbourhoods such as al-Zawiya is lama. This word refers to the
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growing mixture and gathering of people from different backgrounds
who live in the same locality. People from various quarters, villages and
religions are coming to live in the same neighbourhood, hang out at the
same coffee shop, visit the same market, and ride the same bus. These
spaces are defined as lamin as compared to a more homogeneous or less
lama places such as the village and the ‘authentic popular’ quarter based
on long established relationships. Being rooted in a certain area, that is,
localized in a particular place, allows the development of strong
relationships between people. Lama is used to classify different localities
and points to the difference between a neighbourhood where people know
each other by name and face as opposed to more heterogeneous areas
where people are strangers and not to be trusted. Masaakin is lama as
opposed to ahali housing. Al-Zawiya is lama compared to Bulaq and
Cairo is lama compared to the villages where the inhabitants originally
came from.
Relocation and religious identity
Hegemony is not the disappearance or destruction of difference. It is the
construction of a collective will through difference. It is the articulation of
differences which do not disappear. (Hall 1991b: 58)

Despite the significance of Bulaq in how people reimagine their com
munal feelings, this identity does not facilitate the group’s interaction
with the rest of the people who live in al-Zawiya al-Hamra. Relocation
rearranged local identities and added to the old identifications: people
are now identified with a village (the place of origin), as locals of Bulaq
(where they resided for generations), as occupiers of masaakin (which is
stigmatized by dwellers in private housing) and as inhabitants of alZawiya al-Hamra (not known for its good reputation in Cairo). But above
all, they are mainly Muslims. Religion, rather than nationalism, neigh
bourhood and the village of origin, became a powerful discourse in
articulating and socially grounding the various identities of the different
groups residing in al-Zawiya al-Hamra.^ Only the religious identity
promises to articulate these identifications without destroying them.‘“
Displaced families, ahali and masaakin inhabitants, people of Bulaq and
al-Zawiya, rural immigrants, Fallahin (peasants who come from villages
in Lower Egypt) and Sa’idis (immigrants from Upper Egypt), who are
largely pushed from their villages to Cairo in their search for work and
a better life, as well as residents who moved from other areas of Cairo
can all find commonality in religion that is expressed in practices such as
a dress code and the decoration of houses and shops.
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Islam brings people together on the basis of a common religion.
Despite the fact that Muslims do not know each other on a personal
basis, religion creates a ‘safe’ space (the mosque), a common ground
where they are connected to each other, and a sense of trust and rooted
ness. This is clearly manifested in how the mosque, of all public spaces,
is gaining importance in facilitating the interaction of various groups
and the formation of a collective identity. To start with, the mosque’s
growing centrality in daily life is manifested in the many modern services
that are provided to the people in it. Through charitable organizations
{jam’iyyat khayriyya), the mosque provides socially required services
such as affordable education, health care and financial support to the
poor. It is also the place where discourses circulate that prescribe and/
or forbid daily practices. Above all, it is the most acceptable and safest
social space where various groups can meet and interact.
To understand the importance of the mosque, we need to go back to
the word lama. As previously mentioned, people tend to distrust areas
and public spaces that are labelled as lama such as the market, the coffee
shop and the bus. These spaces are seen as ‘dangerous’ and people are
very careful when visiting or utilizing them. Compared to such spaces,
the mosque, which is a historical space that is legitimated through its
naturalized relationship with religion, is currently being actively articu
lated to frame the interaction between members of different groups as
well as to empower emerging meanings, identities and relationships.
Those who are labelled as trouble-makers and rude (people who come
from Bulaq and live in masaakin) as well as the untrustworthy and selfish
(people of al-Zawiya as described by people of Bulaq) can all meet in the
mosque and collectively identify themselves as Muslims.
Thus, the power of the mosque is being currently reinforced through
its promise of an equal and unified community out of a heterogeneous
urban population. It is accessible to all Muslims and brings them in on
equal terms. The unity of prayers and the importance of communal
feelings is manifested in the unifying discourse and the similar move
ments that are performed simultaneously. The Imam leads the prayer
and coordinates the movement of all the attendees through his pro
nounced signals that indicate when one should bend forward on the
knees or stand up straight, and so on. Emphasis is placed upon standing
in straight lines, very close to other attendees, in a way that leaves no
empty spaces through which the devil could enter among the devout and
divide their collectivity."
The feelings that are associated with being part of a collectivity were
cited by many, especially by women, as one of the main reasons for
going to the mosque. As is the case with most of her neighbours, reloca-

RE-IMAGINING THE GLOBAL

I3I

tion shattered most of the support system that connected the fifty-fiveyear-old Umm Ahmed with friends and neighbours who were relocated
to ‘Ain Shams or to different parts of the new housing project in alZawiya al-Hamra. Although she used to perform her religious duties on
a regular basis in Bulaq, Umm Ahmed’s religiosity gained a different
meaning in al-Zawiya al-Hamra. In addition to her adoption of the khimar
(a head garment that covers the hair and the shoulders), which is seen as
the ‘real Islamic dress’, Umm Ahmed began attending local mosques on
a daily basis. She explained that she goes to mosques because the presence
of other people strengthens her will and provides her with more energy
than when praying alone. Currently, Umm Ahmed frequents five local
mosques to perform four out of the five daily prayers. For Friday prayer,
she usually selects a large mosque, located within the boundaries of the
masaakin but that is also attended by some worshippers from the ahali.
She also visits two small mosques that are identified with an Islamic
group active in al-Zawiya al-Hamra. She attends these two mosques,
which are located in the ahalt area, to listen to weekly lessons and
participate in Quran recital sessions. Another mosque, which is located
next to the vegetable market in the ahali area, is a convenient site for the
midday prayer when Umm Ahmed is shopping for the family’s daily
food. For the evening prayer, she chooses a smaller mosque on the edge
of the housing project that is attended by a mixture of worshippers from
ahali and masaakin areas. She prefers this mosque, as she explains,
because she meets ‘wise’ women who like to talk to her. Over the last
five years, Umm Ahmed has formed strong relationships with other
women from different parts of the neighbourhood, especially from the
ahali area, who attend the same mosque. If one of them does not come
to the evening prayer, she goes with other women to ask about their
absent friend. At the same time, the mosque not only brings people
together from the same neighbourhood but also encourages people to
move from one part of the city to the other. Young men and women, for
example, use the city bus to tour the city in their search for the ‘truth’.
They cross the boundaries of their localities to go to other neighbour
hoods to attend certain mosques where popular sheikhs preach.
The mosque is also becoming more open to women in al-Zawiya alHamra. This is perceived by some Islamic activists as essential to counter
other spaces that are open to women, such as universities, the workplace,
cinemas and nightclubs. Women are identified by men as more vulnerable
to the influence of global (defined here as American) discourses and
practices. Women’s actions, dress and access to public life are seen as
threatening the harmony of the Islamic community and as the source of
many social ills. Women have internalized these ideas and hold them-
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selves, and not men, responsible for the safety of the morals of the
community. As women repeatedly emphasize, men are weak creatures
and cannot resist the seduction imposed on them by women who do not
adopt Islamic dress. At the same time, women can be very active in the
construction of the Islamic community. More voices have emphasized
the positive aspects associated with opening the mosque to women who,
as mothers, sisters and wives, can be active agents capable of altering
their own practices as well as shaping the actions and values of other
family members. Thus, to contain the destructive potential of women
and promote their constructive power in the formation of the Islamic
community, more attempts are made by Islamic activists to incorporate
women within the mosque. Currently, women, especially those without
jobs and small children, go to the mosque on a regular basis for prayer
and to attend weekly lessons, while working women usually attend the
Friday prayer. Women are also becoming more active in the mosque
through their roles as teachers, students, workers and seekers of social,
educational and medical services. In addition, more women help in taking
care of the mosque and participate in mosque-related activities such as
preparing food and distributing it to the needy.

Globalization and religious identities
It is important not to confuse my previous discussion of religious identity
with ‘fundamentalism’, ‘extremism’ or ‘militant Islam’, which have been
the centre of attention of several studies (Ibrahim 1982; Kepel 1993).
Fundamentalism especially has been the focus of studies that aim to
examine the relationship between globalization and religion (see, for
example. Turner 1994; Beyer 1994). Such studies limit discussion of the
ideology of the leaders of some radical Islamic groups and tend to present
these movements as ‘responses’ or ‘reactions’ to the global. The role of
ordinary people as active agents in negotiating religious and global dis
courses in their daily life and the formation of their local identities is
largely neglected.
Despite the fact that communal feelings based on religion can be
politicized and used as the basis to mobilize the working class (as
happened in 1981 in clashes between Muslims and Christians in alZawiya al-Hamra), at the daily level religious identity brings people
together as connected selves rather than separated and isolated others. It
articulates the presence of the group at the neighbourhood level, in
tegrates its members into the mosque and secures a space for them in
Cairo. People do not want to relive the past, as some fundamentalists
seem to desire, but try to live in the present with its complexity and
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contradictions. They hence struggle against efforts of some extremist
groups who try to impose restrictions on how they appropriate certain
aspects of modernity. Nuha, for example, is a twenty-three-year-old
woman with a high school diploma who works in a factory outside the
neighbourhood. She hears things on the radio, in the mosque and from
her friends and then lets her heart and mind judge what she will follow.
She expresses her religiosity in adopting the khimar. At the same time,
she opposes many of the restrictions that extremists try to impose on
people, such as forbidding men from wearing trousers and prohibiting
eating with a spoon because, as some argue, the Prophet did not do these
things. She believes that had these things existed when the Prophet was
alive, he would have used them. So it is not a sin {haram) to eat with a
spoon but, if one chooses to eat with the hands, one will get an extra
reward.
There are moments when people directly reject the ‘American con
ception of the world’ (Hall 1991a: 28) with its homogenizing tendencies
and use this conception to explain the conflict between the state and
some Islamic groups. A young woman explained the conflict between the
government and religious groups as follows:
The problem is that the government has strong relationships with the
United States which hates Islam and Muslims and is trying to spread its
ideas and practices all over the world, especially wearing short clothes, the
domination of science, and the destruction of religion. My cousin, who is
a Sunni,explained to me that Americans have many methods to achieve
their purposes, especially through schools. They try to prove that science
is better than religion by using the comparative method. They bring, for
example, a candle and a light bulb and ask which is better. The first
represents religion and the second represents science. Of course, one will
choose the second. They also compare two pictures, one of a man wearing
a gallabiyya [a long loose gown that the Prophet used to wear] with a beard
and a rotten look, while the second picture is of a handsome man who is
shaved and looks very clean and tidy. Of course, anyone will choose the
second. The whole idea is for science to replace religion and dominate the
universe. Islam is compatible with science because one can find all answers
in it if examined closely. Science should serve religion.

The opposition to the ‘global West’, however, is not sufficient to
explain the growing importance of the mosque and religious identity in
al-Zawiya al-Hamra. There are complex local and national forces
juxtaposed with the global to produce religious identity. State oppression,
the daily frustrations in dealing with state bureaucracy, alienation, the
fragmentation of the urban fabric, and the ability of Islamic groups to
utilize various discursive strategies that mobilize people are as important
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as the economic frustration, the unfulfilled expectations and desires, and
the need to have a voice in the global in understanding why religious
identity is becoming more hegemonic.''*
As manifested in the services that are being attached to the mosque in
al-Zawiya al-Hamra, certain global discourses and consumer goods are
negotiated and appropriated. For example, to avoid state censorship of
discourses circulated in the mosque, Islamic activists use cassette tapes
to distribute the religious discourse to a large segment of the urban
population. Especially for illiterate men and women, tapes provide a
powerful means of communication that brings popular preachers (that is,
those who are believed to tell the ‘truth’) from the mosque into the
home, the workplace, the taxi and the street. These can be replayed until
their meanings become clear to the listener. Women can also pass them
on to friends and relatives. On several occasions, women gathered to
listen to such tapes and expressed strong emotional reactions to the
descriptions of death, the horrible torture of the grave and the soothing
visions of heaven.
Various Islamic groups, however, relate differently to the global in
general and the West in particular. While there were some Islamic
activists who attack the influence of the West on the dress code and
practices of Muslims, a major part of the lessons that I attended in the
mosque as well as tapes I heard in al-Zawiya al-Hamra did not attack the
West but emphasized the horrible nature of torture that unbelievers
would go through in the grave and in hell, and, in contrast, the rewards
that are awaiting the believers in heaven. Women who do not adopt
Islamic dress are singled out and detailed descriptions are presented of
how they will be hung from their hair and breasts while huge snakes bite
their bodies as they are grilled in hell. Women shivered, cried and prayed
hard asking God to protect them from the horrible torture that is awaiting
unbelievers. These graphic descriptions contextualize the critique of
people’s ‘un-Islamic’ practices and the ‘medicine’, as one sheikh said,
that is provided to heal the ills of the current situation and to win the
eternal heaven. The prescribed medicine is to go back to God, ask for
his forgiveness, and live according to his commands.
Although the emphasis on the dress code can be seen as a rejection of
the influence of the West, I would argue that gender distinctions are the
centre of the restrictions applied to women’s dress code. Another interest
ing example could be found in how people negotiate their definition of
Islam and modernity. Their rejection of many of the ideas that are
circulated by some religious extremists is clearly manifested by the
struggle over some consumer goods such as colour televisions, VCRs and
tape-recorders which are rapidly becoming signs of distinction. Many
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families participate in saving associations {gam'iyyat) to secure money to
buy these goods which are also seen as investments that can be easily
exchanged for needed cash. Just as Amal, most people dream of consumer
goods and better living conditions that television brings to their homes
without objective means to satisfy them. Many families try to solve
Ramadan puzzles (these are usually presented daily by popular Egyptian
performers) and collect the covers of tea-bags and chocolate bars to mail
to the manufacturer in the hope that they may win a ‘dish’, a familiar
English word that is used to refer to the satellite dishes that are spreading
in upper-class neighbourhoods, a VCR, a washing machine or a gas stove.
Among all the consumer goods that people use, Islamic groups centre
their struggle against the television set. This struggle can be interpreted
as ‘rejection of modernity’, but such an analysis fails to see how other
aspects of modernity are being selectively incorporated in the struggle
of these groups. They use the fax machine, the tape-recorder, the
computer and many other modern facilities to achieve their aims. To
understand the struggle over the television set, one should look how this
medium is being used in people’s daily lives.
Television is one of the most popular goods that people incorporate
as one of the basic elements of their daily lives. Except for very few
people with extreme religious beliefs, there is no housing unit in alZawiya al-Hamra without a television set. Each family, regardless of its
income, owns a television set that is the centre of attention of all the
family members. The television set is a powerful medium that conveys
to them many experiences and values that can be described as global and
brings the Other closer than ever to the self The television set and the
mosque are competing with each other to connect Muslims in different
parts of the world. People of al-Zawiya al-Hamra are connected with
other Muslims whom they have never met and who are not assumed to
be identical duplicates of the self but are identified as the Other that is
closely connected with the self It is the force that binds people of this
neighbourhood with Muslims who fight in Bosnia, Afghanistan and
Chechnya. Young men, who are frustrated with the state’s restriction on
their participation in fighting with the Bosnian Muslims, circulate stories
about God’s help and support of the Bosnians. People talk about invisible
soldiers (angels) and unidentified white planes that bomb the Serbs.
Islam, thus, is becoming a force in localizing the global and globalizing
the local. The distinction between Muslims who live in al-Zawiya alHamra and those who live in the rest of the world (such as the Bosnians)
is blurred. On the other hand, television is blamed by Islamic groups for
corrupting the people, silencing them, and distracting their attention
from God as well as from what happens in their country and the rest of
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the world. With the total state control of this powerful medium, various
Islamic groups do not have any option but to denounce its role in society
and try to forbid it.
People are capable of articulating different discourses within their
religious identity without seeing contradictions in being oriented to the
global and attempting to enjoy what it offers, and being rooted in their
religious and local identities. A twenty-year-old factory worker, who was
born in Bulaq and was relocated with his family in 1980, dreams of
having enough money to buy a villa in Switzerland for skiing during the
winter, another villa in India where he will hire singers and dancers to
perform for him as he has seen on video tapes, and of a palace in Saudi
Arabia to facilitate his performing of pilgrimage every year. As Hall
(1991a; 1993) emphasizes, with identity there are no guarantees. The
openness and fluidity of identities and the multiple discourses that are
competing to shape them make it hard to guarantee whether an identity
is going to be inclusive or exclusive.’®

Conclusion
Paradoxically in our world, marginality has become a powerful space. It is a
space of weak power but it is a space of power, nonetheless. (Hall 1991a: 34)

I have tried to show in this chapter how the articulation of global
discourses and processes is producing contradictory identities at the
national and local levels. By destroying old neighbourhood relationships,
stigmatizing and physically segregating the relocated population, the
project that aimed to construct modern subjects has paradoxically pro
duced antagonistic local identities that empowered the basis of a collective
identity which is based on religion. I have also aimed to show the
important role of active social agents in mediating the different global
practices and selectively articulating certain global discourses in the
formation of their local identities. Social agents face the global in col
lectivities rather than as individuals and the struggle between the local
and the global is not simply taking place in ‘human minds’ (Goonatilake
1995: 232). In general, although ‘new regimes of accumulation’ (Hall
1991a: 30) are appealing to the individual, alienation, racism and uprootedness are being faced collectively. In fact, being part of a collectivity
is necessary to feel at home in the modern world with its rapid global
changes. Thus, the local is not passive and local cultural identities are
not waiting to be wiped out by globalization as some authors suggest
(see, for example, Goonatilake 1995).
Amal’s dreams should continue to remind us that people experience
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the global in structured ways. It should also draw our attention to the
fact that many of the writings on globalization are conducted by people
who feel at home in the global and tend to celebrate the growing ef
ficiency of transportation, electronic communication and the growing
connectedness of the globe (see, for example, Friedland and Boden 1994).
The freedom of travel, however, while experienced by the privileged, is
denied for millions of people who find borders of the global (especially,
the USA and Europe) closed to them. The relationship between the
local and the global cannot be brushed aside by assuming that they are
‘articulated as one’ (Friedland and Boden 1994: 43). Such statements
reduce the complexity of the interaction between the global and the local
and ignore the asymmetrical relationship that is still central to this
interaction. The analysis presented in this chapter points to the need for
more attention and sensitivity to the structured nature of globalization
processes. When people experience the global as a violent attack on their
cultural identities and self-images, it is not strange that they do not
embrace global discourses and its representatives (such as international
tourists). In short, more attention should be devoted to those who live
on the margin of the marginal: those who are displaced in their own
‘culture’ and the millions who cannot find solutions to the growing
number of desires that are brought by the global except through magical
means, death and destruction or religion that at least promises them a
better life and the glories of eternal existence in Paradise.

Notes
I would like to express my appreciation to the Middle East Awards Program in
Population and Development, the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Re
search, Inc. and the International Office at the University of Texas at Austin for
funding my field work in Cairo. I am also thankful to Benjamin Feinberg, Karen
Buckley, Seteney Shami and the editors of this book for their comments on a draft of
this chapter.
1. The birshaam is a type of drug that is believed to be produced and circulated
by the USA and Israel; it is a pill that is taken orally and not sniffed as Amal implies.
2. This phrase should not be taken to mean that the globalization and modern
ization of Cairo started with Sadat’s policies (for a detailed description of Cairo’s
history, see Abu-Lughod 1971). Modernity, however, became a national project for
Sadat and his policies were based on a strong orientation to the rest of the ‘universe’.
The experiences of many Western countries from the United States and Canada to
France and West Germany continue to inform the construction of Cairo.
3. Words such as hadith (modern or new), ‘asri (contemporary or modern) and
madani (civilized or refined) were widely used in the state public discourse.
4. Fifteen years after relocation, no hotels or luxury buildings have been con
structed in this area. Many argue that the plan to rebuild the city centre died with
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Sadat who was killed a few months after the relocation of the residents of a small part
of Bulaq. The piece of land that was evacuated is currently used as a parking lot.
5- For example, one can now watch CNN in Cairo if supplied with cable services,
and satellite dishes are added to the roofs of upper-class residential units.
6. See Mitchell (1988) for an analysis of such constructions under the British
colonization of Egypt.
7. As previously mentioned, with the death of Sadat, the removal of the rest of
Bulaq stopped.
8. Baladi is a complex concept that signifies a sense of authenticity and originality.
It has been discussed in several studies. See, for example. Early (1993) and Messiri
(1978).
9. Although people strongly identify themselves as Egyptians, the state definition
of ‘modern’ Egyptians is exclusive. Different groups are not seen as contributing
positively to the construction of their country and the state believes that its task is to
cure them of their social ills and pathologies in order to turn them into ‘good Egyptian
citizens’ (Ghannam 1993).
10. Let us not forget that Sadat tried to present himself as al-Ra’is al-Mu’min or
‘The Believing President’.
11. In the women’s section, which I had access to, the Friday prayer was coordinated
by a woman who made sure that we were standing correctly and made room to squeeze
in newcomers.
12. Despite the incorporation of women, the mosque is still a highly gendered
space. It manifest and shapes the ways in which gender is constructed. Inside the
mosque, women are spatially separated from men, their access to the mosque is
conditioned by the absence of their menstrual period, and within its confines they are
required to wear long and loose dress and to cover the hair and chest.
13. Al-Sunniyyin (singular Sunni) is used in daily life to refer to Islamic activists
who are considered strict followers of the Prophet’s traditions or Sunna.
14. It is important to remember that, although these processes take place at the
neighbourhood level, they are part of the transformations that Cairo and Egypt in
general have been experiencing in the last two decades.
15. The relationship between Muslims and Christians, for example, in al-Zawiya
al-Hamra is very complicated and beyond the scope of this chapter. Religion also
plays a central role among Christians who live in al-Zawiya. The church serves a
similar role to that of the mosque in bringing Christians together. There is also a
strong tension between the two religious groups that resulted in clashes between them
in 1981.
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